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RE-SHAPING THE “MONROE DOCTRINE”: 
UNITED STATES POLICY CONCERNS IN  
LATIN AMERICA URGENTLY CALL FOR 
RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
The United States has identified important policy goals for Latin 
America,1 but its opposition to the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
blocks the accomplishment of these goals. Essentially, all major Latin 
American nations have ratified the ICC.2 However, these countries are 
now cut off from cooperating with U.S. policy initiatives in the region 
because of U.S. opposition to the ICC.3  
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES MILITARY DOING IN 
PARAGUAY? 
The confrontation between the U.S. and Latin America over the ICC 
became apparent recently when the U.S. military sent 400 troops to a 
remote region of Paraguay to conduct operations for eighteen months.4 
U.S. and Paraguayan officials say that the goal of recent joint military 
exercises is to increase collaboration on counter terrorism, drug-fighting, 
and humanitarian aid efforts.5 According to Alvin Plexico, a Pentagon 
official, the operations will “strengthen the US-Paraguay military-to-
military relationship and improve joint training.”6  
 
 
 1. The policy goals are focused on combating Latin American security threats caused by drugs 
and terrorism. “Several countries are confronting costly threats to security—even in terms of narco-
terrorism or violent crime—that undermine the rule of law and political stability.” Challenges and 
Opportunities for U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Western Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 108th Cong. 7 (2004) (statement of 
Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of 
State), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/108/90359.pdf [hereinafter 
Challenges and Opportunities]. 
 2. International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties, http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
region&id=5.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2006). The twenty Latin American countries that have ratified 
the ICC include regional powers such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Id. 
 3. Fiscal 2006 Defense Budget: Hearing Before the H. Armed Services Comm., 109th Cong. 
(2006) (testimony of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander, U.S. Army Southern Command), 
available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Craddock?20Statements%203-05.pdf [hereinafter Fiscal 2006 
Defense Budget].  
 4. Sam Logan, U.S. Rethinks Military Presence in South America, ISN SECURITY WATCH, Sept. 
21, 2005, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=12899. 
 5. Kevin Gray, U.S. Military in Paraguay Unsettles South America, RESOURCE CENTER OF THE 
AMERICAS.ORG, Sept. 28, 2005, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N26651120.htm. 
 6. See Logan, supra note 4. 
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However, the current U.S. military operation in Paraguay has brought 
attention to the confrontation between the U.S. and Latin America over the 
refusal of the U.S. to join the ICC. Argentina has expressed a general 
Latin American concern that these military exercises should not occur 
until the United States agrees to join the ICC.7 As support for its position, 
Argentina cites the ICC’s goal of universal justice, encouraging the U.S. to 
add this goal to its foreign policy scheme.8  
Further concerns about the reluctance of the U.S. to join the ICC have 
been raised by MERCOSUR.9 MERCOSUR is an economic bloc which 
includes Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina, in addition to Paraguay.10 
Allowing the presence of the U.S. military in Paraguay allegedly goes 
against the framework of MERCOSUR.11 One MERCOSUR member, 
Brazil, called for transparency in the military cooperation between 
Paraguay and the U.S. and expressed its disagreement with Paraguay’s 
decision to permit military operations.12  
Many unsettling questions remain about the U.S. military presence in 
Paraguay.13 Indeed, growing numbers of protestors in the region are 
demanding that the U.S. offer legitimate reasons for its refusal to join the 
ICC if it plans to remain in Paraguay.14  
 
 
 7. Concern in Argentina at U.S. Troops in Paraguay, RESOURCE CENTER OF THE 
AMERICAS.ORG, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.americas.org/item_21778. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Brazil Denounces U.S. Military Presence in Paraguay, BRAZZIL MAG., Sept. 14, 2005, 
http://www.brazzilmag.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3947&Itemid=49. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Larry Birns, a political analyst and executive director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs 
in Washington, stated that the increased military ties with Paraguay could damage political 
relationships in the region. He called on Washington to address the unsettling questions surrounding 
the operations before further damage is done. Birns said the operations have the potential for 
“damaging regional geopolitical ramifications far beyond anything that Washington may have 
anticipated as of now. We would like to remove this temptation before it gets Washington into 
trouble.” Kelly Hearn, U.S. Military Presence in Paraguay Irks Neighbors, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Dec. 2, 2005, at 25. 
 14. The protestors are concerned with the refusal of the United States to ratify the ICC. Their 
concerns were magnified by the recent decision of the Paraguayan legislature to grant immunity from 
international prosecution to the U.S. soldiers conducting operations in Paraguay.  
On January 17, members of Paraguayan social and political organizations marched in 
Asunción and burned U.S. flags to protest the presence of U.S. soldiers in their country, and 
to condemn the Paraguayan legislature’s decision last year to let in the troops and grant them 
immunity from prosecution. The protests are being held on the 17th day of each month, with 
a larger national mobilization planned for May, 2006, as a new contingent of U.S. troops is 
expected to arrive in June. The protests are also being coordinated with activists in other 
countries.  
March Against U.S. Troops, WEEKLY NEWS UPDATE ON THE AMERICAS, Jan. 29, 2006 (#835), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/7
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This Note explores the growing tensions between the U.S. and Latin 
America over the role of the ICC. It argues that U.S. ratification of the 
ICC is essential to accomplish urgent policy priorities in the region.  
II. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING LATIN AMERICA 
The United States has a history of political and military intervention in 
Latin America that dates back to the Monroe Doctrine.15 The Monroe 
Doctrine stated that the United States would protect the interests of the 
Western Hemisphere from outside sources of interference.16 However, 
after the Monroe Doctrine was adopted, military intervention, combined 
with a desire to dominate the region economically, shaped U.S. policy 
toward Latin America.17 
During the Cold War, U.S. policy focused on combating communism 
in Latin America.18 This made human rights policy a second-tier 
concern.19 As a result, the U.S. tolerated and even supported regimes that 
were “violating human rights but deemed anti-communist.”20 
U.S. policy toward Latin America changed significantly following the 
decline of the perceived communist threat. This policy shift has made it 
possible for the U.S. to give greater respect to the sovereignty of Latin 
American nations and to increase its concern for human rights in the 
region. Further, the U.S. has been able to address regional issues through 
multilateral efforts rather than its historical tendency towards unilateral 
 
 
available at http://www.americas.org/item_24687. 
 15. The concept of U.S. control over affairs of the Western Hemisphere, known as the “Monroe 
Doctrine,” first took hold nearly 200 years ago. Since that time the doctrine has become deeply 
entrenched in our policy toward Latin America. “Ever since [adoption of] the Monroe Doctrine, the 
United States has regarded Latin America largely as U.S. ‘turf.’ It has been almost second nature for 
administrations in Washington, D.C., to intervene politically and militarily and to dominate 
economically in the region.” Introduction! U.S. and Latin American Relations, WORLD AND I, Sept. 
2004 [hereinafter U.S. and Latin American Relations]. 
 16. James Monroe, Message from the President of the United States to Both Houses of Congress 
at the Commencement of the First Session of the Eighteenth Congress (Dec. 2, 1823), available at 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp (search “Enter search terms” for “State of the Union,” restrict 
search by “Congress,” select “18(1823-1825)”; follow “State of the Union Address” Dec. 2, 1823, 15 
pp. hyperlink; follow “Replica of Original-Complete” hyperlink). See also U.S. State Dep’t, The 
Monroe Doctrine, http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/50.htm. President James Monroe 
made the Monroe Doctrine’s bold pronouncement of the U.S. role in the Western Hemisphere in 1823, 
when Latin America was just emerging from colonization. Id. 
 17. See U.S. and Latin American Relations, supra note 15. 
 18. Kati Suominen, U.S. Human Rights Policy Toward Latin America, SPECIAL REPORT (U.S. 
Inst. of Peace), Jan. 23, 2001, at 2, available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/usip/www. 
usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr65.pdf. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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intervention.21 These changes give the U.S. an opportunity to reshape the 
centuries-old Monroe Doctrine. 
A. Current Latin America Policy Concerns: Drug Trafficking and 
Terrorism 
The Latin American policy concerns of the U.S. and its desire to 
promote democracy reflect the changing security situation in the region 
after the fall of communism.22 However, the current changes in U.S. 
policy toward Latin America must take into account the serious security 
threats posed by drugs and terrorism.23 The new U.S. policy must also 
reflect the need to alter the character of U.S. involvement in Latin 
America24 and acknowledge past problems of heavy-handed intervention.  
U.S. policymakers have clearly identified drug trafficking and 
terrorism as the principal concerns in Latin America.25 Targeting the 
illegal drug trade has been recognized as an essential component of U.S. 
policy.26 Further, the terrorist threat posed by increasing activity of Islamic 
 
 
 21. Greater respect by the U.S. for the sovereignty of Latin American nations coincides with a 
willingness to use multilateral efforts to address crucial regional issues. This shift towards 
multilateralism has been marked by increased U.S. participation in the region’s joint institutions, and 
surprisingly, this increase has been sustained even after the events of September 11, 2001.  
[I]n recent decades, Washington has arguably begun to respect Latin nations’ sovereignty far 
more than usual. Especially in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the 
demise of the world communist threat, America has become reluctant to take matters into its 
own hands in dealing with Latin problems and has become more comfortable with addressing 
them through joint institutions such as the Organization of American States, the World Trade 
Organization, or the incipient Free Trade Area of the Americas. As U.S. unilateralism has 
increased post-September 11 vis-a-vis the Near East and South Asia, so it has decreased with 
regard to its own backyard south of the border. 
U.S. and Latin American Relations, supra note 15. The trend toward multilateralism is evidenced by 
U.S. participation in the developing Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Robert B. Zoellick, 
then U.S. Trade Representative, named the FTAA a top policy priority for the U.S. The FTAA would 
create a free trade zone among the thirty-four democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere. Press 
Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Announces Regional Seminar on the FTAA 
(July 2, 2002), http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2002/July/US_Announces_ 
Regional_Seminar_on_the_FTAA.html?ht=. 
 22. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, State’s Noriega Outlines Priorities for Western 
Hemisphere (Mar. 2, 2005), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/. 
 23. See Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 1. Security threats in Latin America remain 
due to drugs and terrorism. Id.  
 24. See generally id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. The Bush Administration has focused on attacking the cocaine and heroin trade in Colombia 
and in the Andes region. Its policy recognizes that “the profits from illegal drug sales support violent 
criminal gangs and terrorist groups.” Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 1, at 13. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/7
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militant groups in Latin America has become a primary policy focus of the 
U.S.27  
Of special concern to the U.S. are “lawless areas” in Latin America that 
are comprised of zones where the national government does not have 
effective control.28 Lawless areas have drawn the attention of U.S. 
policymakers because drug traffickers and terrorists establish operations in 
these areas.29 Specific lawless areas that are of great concern include the 
Triple Frontier area (encompassing the shared border areas of Argentina, 
Brazil and Paraguay), the Darien peninsula in Panama, and the Maicao 
region in Colombia.30 Concern for the lawless conditions in the Triple 
Frontier area led to current U.S. military operations in Paraguay.31 
B. The Crisis in Latin America Requires Immediate U.S. Policy Attention 
A U.S. Congressman recently summarized the situation in Latin 
America as a crisis caused by drug trafficking and terrorist activity.32 This 
 
 
 27. Islamic terrorist groups may easily establish themselves in both large cities and remote, 
ungoverned areas throughout Latin America. 
For much of the Bush administration’s anxiety has to do with the relative facility with which 
Islamist terrorists, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qa’ida, can establish themselves in the 
big cities, provincial capitals, and ungoverned areas of South and Central America. There are 
six million people of Muslim descent living in Latin America; 1.5 million live in Brazil 
(which contains more Lebanese Arabs than Lebanon itself) . . . . 
Julio A. Cirino, Silvanal Elizondo & Geoffrey Vawro, Latin America’s Lawless Areas and Failed 
States: An Analysis of the “New Threats,” in 21 NEWPORT PAPERS 7 (Paul D. Taylor ed., U.S. Naval 
War College 2004).  
 28. The Naval War College “adopted the label ‘lawless areas’ to identify those regions not 
effectively controlled by the state.” Id. at 10. 
 29. “Lawless areas” are dangerous because the national government does not have control of the 
area, allowing for the establishment of many types of illegal activity. Id.  
“Lawless areas” are where:  
rogue elements—organized crime and terrorist groups—have comfortably settled. The 
sovereign power of the state is its ability to enforce the law and provide security for a country 
and its citizens. Thus, if the state is unable to enforce the law in portions of its territory, then 
we have the setting for a new lawless area and its entire array of illegal activities, which, 
importantly, have their own independent codes of conduct that function in place of national 
law. 
Id. 
 30. Id. at 9. 
 31. The official purposes of the operation that focused on the Triple Frontier area were to bolster 
counter terrorism, to fight drugs, and to provide humanitarian aid. Gray, supra note 5. 
 32. Congressman Bill Delahunt of Massachusetts, in a hearing before the International Relations 
Committee of the House of Representatives, candidly characterized the situation in Latin America as a 
crisis:  
But at the same time I think as we look at the landscape of Latin America, you know, honesty 
compels us to really conclude that we are in a crisis. One can list the countries. I think it was 
you, Roger [Noriega], who mentioned Cuba, Venezuela, and Haiti. Paraguay has been a 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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crisis poses a direct threat to the U.S. and requires immediate attention 
from U.S. policymakers.33 However, present foreign aid to the region falls 
far short of what is needed to address the crisis, especially when compared 
to the tremendous military aid pumped into the region during the 1980s.34 
Strong U.S. leadership and engagement with the countries of the 
Western Hemisphere is needed to address the present crisis in Latin 
America.35 Increasing development and security aid to the region will 
effectively address the crisis if the assistance targets security threats, 
improves the capacity of local governments to meet social needs, and 
creates economies that allow all people to participate in growth.36  
Recalling the long and sordid history of U.S. intervention in Latin 
America, the key to addressing the important issues of the region is for the 
U.S. to align its policy with the priorities of the collective national 
governments in the region.37 Indeed, the Bush Administration has 
identified the critical need for the U.S. to act multilaterally in the region.38 
Acting multilaterally in the region requires the adoption of a Latin 
 
 
single-party state for how many years now? For decades. Certainly not an example of a 
vibrant, healthy democracy. 
Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 1, at 32.  
 33. Adolfo A. Franco, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean of the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, stated that the crisis in the region is a result of drug trafficking 
and terrorism. He emphasized that the gravity of the crisis was due to Latin America’s proximity to the 
U.S.:  
Nowhere else do events—such as the political instability we witnessed in Bolivia, the 
terrorism that we have in the Andean region, drug trafficking in South America and the 
Caribbean, and the economic crisis of the region—have such a profound effect on our 
national interest and the well-being of the American people. 
Id. at 19.  
 34. U.S. aid for Latin America is approximately $839 million, with roughly $200 million of that 
amount sent to Colombia and Haiti. In the past, when force was used to achieve policy goals in the 
region (for example, Central America in the 1980s), the U.S. spent billions of dollars. Now, with the 
U.S. trying to aid development efforts in those countries and help stabilize institutions and promote 
democracy, aid has dwindled. Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 1, at 8.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Roger F. Noriega, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, stated the 
following: 
United States development and security assistance can be decisive if it is used well. The ideal 
role for U.S. assistance is to help governments improve their own ability to meet basic social 
needs, deal with acute threats to security, and retool their economies so that their people can 
take full advantage of economic growth. 
Id. 
 37. “But in recent decades, Washington has arguably begun to respect Latin nations’ sovereignty 
far more than usual.” U.S. and Latin American Relations, supra note 15. 
 38. Roger F. Noriega noted that “multilateralism works in the Americas. The Organization of 
American States and the Summit of the Americas process are used by regional governments to revise 
common strategies and to put their political weight behind a comprehensive economic and political 
agenda.” Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 1, at 8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/7
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American policy that will allow the U.S. to work alongside countries in 
the region to address the present crisis.39 
III. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
OVERWHELMING ACCEPTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND UNFOUNDED 
FEARS LEADING TO OPPOSITION  
FROM THE U.S. 
The ICC was developed in response to “the need for the establishment 
of an international institution that could address serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.”40 Ad hoc tribunals were created during 
the mid-1990s to deal with grave violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.41 The problems 
encountered with these temporary tribunals underlined the urgent need for 
the adoption of a stable and permanent international criminal court to deal 
with the most severe crimes.42 
Responding to the need for a permanent international criminal tribunal, 
the Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted on July 17, 1998.43 Upon receipt 
of the required sixtieth country ratification, the ICC became a reality; the 
treaty of the Rome Statute entered into binding force on April 11, 2002.44 
A. Widespread Support for the ICC in Latin America 
The Rome Statute has received widespread support in Latin America 
where, as of October 2005, twenty-one countries have ratified the ICC.45 
 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Leila Nadya Sadat, The Evolution of the ICC: From the Hague to Rome and Back Again, in 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 38 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen 
eds., 2000). See also David J. Scheffer, The U.S. Perspective on the ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 116, 45 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000). 
Everyone in Rome shared a common goal: “that an international court should be able to prosecute 
tyrants who commit mass murder, mass rape, or mass torture against their own citizens . . . .” Id. 
 41. Sadat, supra note 40, at 38. 
 42. The temporary tribunals had a variety of problems, bringing to light the need for a permanent 
international criminal court: 
The problems that the two ad hoc tribunals faced in recruiting top-flight prosecutors and 
judges, financing their activities, and obtaining custody of suspects—not to mention the 
allegations of corruption that beset the Rwanda tribunal—did not dampen enthusiasm for the 
ICC. Rather, they underlined the urgent need for a stable, new, permanent institution that 
would be ready for any situation. 
Id. 
 43. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, VOLUME 1: INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATED TEXT 89–91 (2005). 
 44. Id. at 109. 
 45. International Criminal Court Assembly of State Parties, supra note 2. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The ICC is popular in Latin America because it offers protections to a 
region that recently suffered periods of authoritarian rule that led to 
serious human rights violations.46 Latin America has changed dramatically 
in the last twenty years with democratically elected governments now in 
control, but significant human rights concerns remain.47 Therefore, 
because Latin America still feels it needs to strengthen judicial systems 
and increase international monitoring of human rights, it supports the 
ICC.48  
B. The Bush Administration and U.S. Opposition to the ICC 
With Bill Clinton serving as president, the United States supported the 
ICC when the Rome Statute was enacted in 1998.49 When George W. 
Bush became president, however, the U.S. withdrew its support for the 
ICC and stated publicly that it was not bound by the treaty.50 U.S. 
opposition to the ICC is primarily based upon fears that American soldiers 
and political leaders could be brought before an international court on 
frivolous and politically motivated grounds.51  
Other opponents of the ICC emphasize that the U.S. has historically 
supported human rights and is better qualified to prosecute war criminals 
 
 
 46. Armed conflict and authoritarian rule caused human rights violations and created much 
support in Latin America for a tribunal that would bring the perpetrators of gross human rights abuses 
to justice.  
Attitudes to the International Criminal Court in Latin America are inevitably shaped by the 
recent history of the region, which has been characterized by periods of serious and 
widespread human rights violations, with little, if any, effort to seek justice against those 
responsible . . . . Over the past 20 years, following periods of armed conflict or authoritarian 
rule, countries in Latin America have struggled with the issue of justice for serious human 
rights violations. 
Margaret Popkin, Latin America: The Court and the Culture of Impunity, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, 
December 2003, http://www.crimesofwar.org/icc_magazine/icc-popkin.html. 
 47. Despite the rise of democracy in Latin America, many governments still struggle to deal with 
human rights issues. “Over the past two decades, the era of military regimes and massive human rights 
violations has given way to democratically elected governments. Yet the region’s civilian governments 
continue to face urgent human rights problems.” Suominen, supra note 18. 
 48. In Latin America, long-term solutions, including the ICC and strengthening internal justice 
systems, are viewed as necessary to address human rights violations. “Today’s challenges in the region 
require long-term approaches: fostering judicial systems, professionalizing police and armed forces, 
building vibrant civil societies, and strengthening inter-American and international institutions 
working on human rights.” Id. 
 49. President Bill Clinton held a “long commitment to establish an appropriate international 
criminal court.” Scheffer, supra note 40, at 116. 
 50. John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y for Arms Control and Int’l Security, Remarks to the Federalist 
Society: The United States and the International Criminal Court (Nov. 14, 2002). 
 51. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, U.S. AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.hrw. 
org/campaigns/icc/us.htm. 
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than many ICC signatory countries.52 Additionally, some observers 
believe that the ICC will not function without U.S. support, so therefore, 
the U.S. should not join the ICC until all the conditions the U.S. desires 
are in place.53 
C. U.S. Opposition to the ICC is Based Upon Unfounded Fears 
An examination of the Rome Statute reveals that U.S. opposition to the 
ICC is based upon unwarranted fears and an inaccurate view of the 
statute.54 The opening pronouncements of the Rome Statute, which state 
its overarching purpose, are consistent with the ideals and laws of the 
U.S., including a desire to protect against the worst human atrocities.55 
The primary U.S. objection to the ICC is that U.S. nationals would face 
frivolous prosecution before the Court.56 This objection is completely 
unfounded because the statute explicitly states that the U.S. would retain 
jurisdiction over its nationals and maintain a preference over the ICC for 
any prosecution.57 
The U.S. should not fear the ICC because the Rome Statute actually 
represents a significant advancement in international law regarding 
protections for the rights of the accused and ensures prosecution only of 
the most serious crimes.58 Indeed, the Rome Statute provides protections 
 
 
 52. International Criminal Court: The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
 53. In order for the permanent court to be effective, it may need the significant support of the 
U.S.  
to sustain a costly investigative capability, to build its infrastructure in The Hague, to achieve 
custody of indictees, and to work with the U.N. Security Council for enforcement initiatives 
. . . . We fear that without the United States, the effectiveness of the permanent ICC will fall 
far short of its potential.  
Scheffer, supra note 40, at 116. 
 54. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 932 (2001). 
 55. Consistent with the ideals and laws of the United States, the Preamble states that an 
International Criminal Court is needed because “during this century millions of children, women and 
men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.” Id.  
 56. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51.  
 57. The preamble provides that it is “the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes.” HENKIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 932. Thus, the 
primary contention that United States politicians and servicemen will face frivolous prosecutions is 
explicitly dealt with in the preamble. Furthermore, articles 17 and 18 regarding admissibility also 
make U.S. concerns moot. Id. at 933–34. These articles defer to the criminal jurisdiction of an 
individual State to prosecute its nationals or others regarding international crimes covered by the 
statute. Id. Therefore, the U.S. has prosecutorial preference, which prevents U.S. nationals from being 
brought before the ICC. Id. at 932. 
 58. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 933–34. 
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for accused persons that are arguably more comprehensive than the U.S. 
Bill of Rights.59  
U.S. participation in the ICC would prove better for U.S. nationals than 
existing international arrangements because “an American citizen would 
enjoy more due process before the ICC than before the courts of most 
countries to which the United States extradites its citizens.”60 The United 
States should abandon its misguided opposition and join the ICC because 
the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to only the most heinous international 
crimes, which all nations agree should be vigorously prosecuted.61 
IV. LEGAL MEASURES TAKEN BY THE U.S. TO UNDERMINE THE ICC  
Although U.S. fears regarding the ICC are unfounded, the Bush 
Administration has actively opposed the Court through a campaign of 
legal initiatives aimed at undermining the Court’s effectiveness. When it 
became apparent that the ICC would achieve ratification in 2002, the U.S. 
swiftly responded by enacting the American Servicemembers’ Protection 
Act (ASPA), which contains provisions prohibiting U.S. cooperation with 
the ICC.62 ASPA also included sanctions that prohibited some forms of 
U.S. aid from going to certain countries that have joined the ICC.63 
A. Bilateral Immunity Agreements 
The U.S. position of actively undermining the ICC, as it is spelled out 
in the ASPA, has been strengthened by the promotion of Bilateral 
Immunity Agreements (BIAs). The United States utilizes the BIAs to 
exempt its citizens from the jurisdiction of the ICC.64 A BIA is entered 
 
 
 59. Articles 66 and 67 of the ICC cover the “presumption of innocence” and “rights of the 
accused.” Id. at 974–75. These articles guarantee a person accused before the ICC a presumption of 
innocence, a right to counsel, a right to present evidence and to confront witnesses, a right to remain 
silent, and a right to have charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. See also HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE ICC AND THE UNITED STATES [hereinafter HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH Q&A], http://www.hrw.org/ campaigns/icc/usqna.htm. 
 60. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Q&A, supra note 59. 
 61. Article 5 of the Rome Statute describes the “Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” The 
crimes covered by the statute include: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 933–34. 
 62. 22 U.S.C. § 7401 (1999). 
 63. The House Armed Services Committee reported in March 2005 that “[s]anctions enclosed in 
the ASPA statute prohibit International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds from going to 
certain countries that are parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” Fiscal 2006 
Defense Budget, supra note 3.  
 64. BIAs attempt to shield U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the ICC. Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, U.S. Bilateral Immunity Agreements, http://iccnow.org/documents/ 
USandICC/2005/FS-BIAsAug2005.pdf. 
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into with only one other state, and it provides that the contracting state 
cannot transfer any current or former U.S. government official, military 
personnel, or national to the jurisdiction of the ICC.65  
The BIAs seek to exploit article 98 of the Rome Statute.66 Article 98 
states that the ICC cannot request a state to “act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law . . . or international agreements.”67 
Therefore, the Court allegedly cannot force a state to act contrary to the 
BIA it has signed with the U.S., ensuring that the U.S. will remain beyond 
the scope of the ICC. 
B. Legal Challenges to U.S. Opposition Measures 
The United States has urgently pushed to undermine the ICC by 
signing BIAs with as many states as possible, yet these agreements face 
serious legal challenges.68 Many legal commentators argue that the BIAs 
are contrary to the intent of the Rome Statute because article 98 was not 
intended to allow the formation of new agreements.69 Instead, the article 
was meant to only cover existing agreements that were in force at the time 
the statute was adopted.70  
These commentators further argue that the U.S. has incorrectly 
interpreted article 98 because the BIAs undermine the purpose of the ICC 
“to ensure that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes be 
addressed either at the national level or by an international judicial 
body.”71 Although the United States has signed over ninety BIAs, the 
agreements remain a contentious international issue with many states 
publicly refusing to succumb to U.S. pressure to sign the agreements.72 
 
 
 65. It should be noted that the BIAs are not limited to just protecting members of the U.S. 
military. They also extend immunity to government officials and other nationals. “Dubbed bilateral 
immunity agreements (BIAs) by leading legal experts, the US-requested agreements provide that 
current or former government officials, military [sic] and other personnel (regardless of whether or not 
they are nationals of the state concerned) or nationals are not transferred to the jurisdiction of the 
ICC.” Id. 
 66. Article 98 of the Rome Statute, which created the ICC, is titled “Cooperation with respect to 
waiver of immunity and consent to surrender.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 
98, July 17, 1998, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Experts in international law argue that the BIAs should not be upheld. “Many governmental, 
legal and non-governmental experts have concluded that the bilateral agreements being sought by the 
US government are contrary to international law and the Rome Statute . . . .” Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, supra note 64. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. As of August 2005, over ninety countries have signed BIAs with the U.S. “Fifty-three states 
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Indeed, over half the states that are party to the ICC have not signed a BIA 
with the U.S.73  
In spite of the legal questions surrounding the validity of the BIAs, the 
U.S. has continued to utilize the agreements and has threatened to 
withhold aid if states refuse to sign. In August 2002, upon the passage of 
the ASPA, the U.S. began using economic threats to coerce states into 
signing BIAs.74 At that time, the U.S. State Department clarified that 
section 2007 of ASPA prohibited giving military assistance to countries 
that are a party to the Rome Statute, but the president could waive the ban 
on military aid if the state entered into a BIA.75 
C. Economic Threats to Countries that Refuse to Enter into a Bilateral 
Immunity Agreement with the U.S. 
The U.S. has only intensified its program of economic threats toward 
countries that have taken a stand against entering into a BIA. In December 
2004, Congress approved the “Nethercutt Amendment” as part of a federal 
spending bill.76 The Nethercutt Amendment guaranteed further spending 
cuts, including the withholding of anti-terrorism funds, to countries that 
refused to sign BIAs.77  
The Nethercutt Amendment increased funding cuts and included 
additional countries to be affected, including many South American 
 
 
have publicly refused to sign these agreements on the basis of their obligations under international law 
and the Rome Statute and their commitment to ending impunity.” Id.  
 73. “Nevertheless, over half of the States Parties to the ICC have not signed BIAs.” Id.  
 74. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: US EFFORTS TO OBTAIN 
IMPUNITY FOR GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES 18 (2002), http://web. 
amnesty.org/library/pdf/IOR400252002ENGLISH/$File/IOR4002502.pdf. 
 75. In August 2002, the U.S. State Department  
briefed foreign ambassadors on US opposition to the court and to warn them of the 
prohibition in Section 2007 of the American Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA), which 
entered into force on 2 August 2002, against military assistance to countries that are a party to 
the treaty establishing the court, but allowing the US President to waive this ban if the state 
enters into an impunity agreement with the USA or if he decides that it is in the national 
interest. 
Id.  
 76. Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Congress Tries to Undermine War Crimes Court, 
http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/membermediastatements/2004/HRW_NethercuH_08Dec04.pdf. 
 77. Id. Human Rights Watch provided the following assessment of the Nethercutt Amendment: 
The United States intensified its assault on international justice with Congress’ approval 
yesterday of the “Nethercutt Amendment” . . . . This provision, part of an overall spending 
bill, mandates withholding antiterrorism funds and other aid from countries that refuse to 
grant immunity for U.S. citizens before the International Criminal Court. 
Id.  
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countries.78 The Amendment was reauthorized on November 14, 2005.79 
For fiscal year 2006, Latin American countries face cuts in economic aid 
of up to $30.3 million.80  
D. The Harmful Effects of Opposition Legal Measures in Latin America 
The U.S. opposition program, implemented through ASPA provisions 
and the BIAs, cuts military and development aid to countries that have 
joined the ICC.81 Because of the overwhelming support for the ICC in 
Latin America, the region has suffered a disproportionate impact, with 
eleven countries receiving cuts in aid.82 This is ironic because Latin 
America has been identified as a region in desperate need of U.S. policy 
attention.83 
 
 
 78. The Nethercutt Amendment increased funding cuts for up to fifty countries over their refusals 
to enter BIAs:  
Many of the countries affected have already had military assistance withheld under previous 
legislation, but the latest provision expands funding cuts and includes additional countries. 
Over fifty nations could be affected, including Ecuador, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, 
and Cyprus. These countries have concluded that their current legal obligations as ratifiers of 
the Rome Statute (the ICC’s treaty) prevent them from signing the agreements proposed by 
the Administration, which would violate Article 98 of the Rome Statute. But many of these 
allies have standing SOFAs (Status of Forces Agreements) with the U.S. that extends U.S. 
jurisdiction to include U.S. personnel within their territory. 
Press Release, Citizens for Global Solutions, U.S. Sanctions Key Allies over ICC Participation: Cuts 
Support for over 50 countries, including anti-terror initiatives (Dec. 8, 2004), http://iccnow.org/ 
documents/CGS_Nethercutt_08Dec04.pdf#search=%22%20%22ecuador%2C%20paraguay%2C%20b
olivia%2C%20peru%2C%20venezuela%2C%20and%20cyprus%22%22. 
 “Nine Latin American countries risk losing an additional $21 million in military funding for 
training and equipment purchases in 2005 and 2006, including allies in the war on drugs like Boliva 
and Peru. Mexico’s cut would be $3.6 million.” Pablo Bachelet, MEXICO: U.S. aid threatened by 
global court pact, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 23, 2005, at A17, available at 2005 WLNR 17143772. 
 79. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 
No. 109-102, 83 Stat. 2172, 2229 (2005). “On November 14th, the President signed into law the 
‘Nethercutt Amendment’ to the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. Similar to FY 2005, the 
amendment cuts Economic Support Funds to all countries that refuse to sign bilateral immunity 
agreements with the U.S. or are not provided Presidential waivers.” American Nongovernmental 
Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Nethercutt Amendment reauthorized for 
FY 2006, http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/congress_texts.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 80. Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela stand to lose $30.3 million in U.S. 
economic support funds. Citizens for Global Solutions, Latin American Nations Targeted in the FY 
2006 Foreign Ops (Nov. 15, 2005), http://www.globalsolutions.org/programs/law_justice/latin_ 
amer_nations.html. 
 81. See Fiscal 2006 Defense Budget, supra note 3 and text accompanying note 63. 
 82. “Of the 22 nations worldwide affected by these sanctions, 11 of them are in Latin America, 
hampering the engagement and professional contact that is an essential element of our regional 
security cooperation strategy.” Id.  
 83. Id. 
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U.S. military officials have recognized that the cuts in aid to Latin 
America gravely threaten U.S. efforts to combat terrorism and drug-
trafficking in the area.84 The tangible effect of cutting aid to Latin America 
is that the U.S. loses contact with the region, allowing others to fill the 
power void.85 Therefore, the U.S. is missing out on a promising 
opportunity to help Latin American governments develop democratic 
institutions that would assist the U.S. in confronting serious problems 
within the region.86  
The Bush Administration must develop a strong and coherent policy to 
address the problems presently confronting Latin America.87 Serious 
policy analysis recognizes that the administration’s opposition to the ICC, 
and specifically the cuts in aid to Latin America, only undermines 
necessary policy development for the region.  
E. Mexico Takes a Stand 
Mexico ratified the Rome Statute on October 28, 2005.88 It was the 
one-hundredth country to join the Court.89 Although the U.S. threatened to 
 
 
 84. General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, testified before the 
House Armed Services Committee, in March 2005, that the cuts in aid result in a lack of training and 
equipment for forces in Latin American countries, weakening their ability to adequately address policy 
concerns. “For the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, that’s 11 nations that I cannot now do military 
education exchange training with their militaries nor provide foreign military financing for articles that 
they will need in their defense establishment to equip their armed forces, to fight the narcoterrorists, 
things like that.” Id.  
 85. “The impact obviously is we’re going to lose contact. And as I mentioned previously and 
based on your question, others will fill in the void . . . .” Fiscal 2006 Defense Budget, supra note 3.  
 86. General Craddock stressed that the U.S. must maintain contact with Latin American 
militaries in order to ensure that the military and civilian leaderships in Latin American countries 
achieve policy goals by working within the democratic process. Craddock stated that “in Latin 
America where contact is the coin of the realm, where engagement is really where we make the 
progress in reinforcing these democratic institutions and ensuring that militaries understand the 
democratic process and the subordination to civilian leadership, it’s critical we have contact across the 
board.” Id.  
 87. The Bush Administration has been inattentive to Latin America, and the BIAs further 
exacerbate the problem:  
This Administration’s Latin America policy is more notable for the lack of a policy than for 
any specific or coherent policy, and the Administration’s myopic tendency to rush in when 
there is a problem, and ignore the region the rest of the time only undermines our credibility 
in Latin America. 
Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 1, at 2. 
 88. “On 28 October 2005, Mexico became the 100th state party to the Rome Statute marking an 
important milestone towards universal support of the International Criminal Court. Over half of the 
international community have now ratified.” Press Release, Amnesty International, Mexico: 100th 
Ratification of International Criminal Court Marks an Historic Development in International Justice 
(Oct. 28, 2005), http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/document.do?id=ENGAMR410802005. 
 89. Id. 
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cut back its economic aid to Mexico by 40% when Mexico ratified the 
Rome Statute, Mexico defied the U.S. and refused to enter into a BIA.90 
Mexico’s ratification of the ICC has drawn close attention by Congress 
because of its strategic importance.91 “[Mexico] ranks as the second 
biggest U.S. trading partner and the biggest entry point for illegal migrants 
and cocaine.”92 The confrontation between the U.S. and Mexico over the 
ICC has reached a critical point.93 As observed by Paulina Vega, the Latin 
America and Caribbean coordinator for the Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court, “The United States will have to evaluate just how far its 
rejection of the ICC goes.”94  
U.S. government officials are now calling on the Bush Administration 
to change its stance regarding the penalties imposed on countries that join 
the ICC rather than provoke a crisis with Mexico and other Latin 
American countries.95 The U.S. officials are especially frustrated with the 
domestic implications of “[w]ithdrawing aid to Mexico for anti-drug 
programs that keep illegal drugs out of the United States . . . .”96 These 
 
 
 90. The Bush Administration warned Mexico that joining the Court “would lead to the cut of an 
$11.5 million program to help [Mexico’s] justice system deal with drug trafficking, according to 
human rights groups that support the Dutch-based court . . . . That amounts to almost 40 percent of the 
U.S. economic aid Mexico receives.” Bachelet, supra note 78, at A17.  
 91. “Mexico’s ratification of the court is being monitored especially closely by human rights 
groups and members of Congress because the country is so critical to Washington’s strategic 
interests.” Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. “A growing number of U.S. defense and congressional officials fear such a move will cost 
Washington influence in a region already vulnerable to political instability and are pushing President 
Bush to issue a first-ever waiver of the sanctions.” Id.  
Mexico last week became the 100th country to join the International Criminal Court, and in 
so doing put pressure on the White House to decide how far the United States will go to 
provoke a crisis with its Latin neighbor. Prudence would suggest that the U.S.-Mexico 
relationship is too important for strategic and other reasons to put at risk because of Mexico’s 
decision to act in its own best interest. But the White House has shown little prudence when it 
comes to the ICC. 
Editorial, Sure Path to Losing Friends and Influence, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 2005, at A22.  
 96. Editorial, supra note 95. “U.S. military aid to Mexico is particularly sensitive because 
Mexican security forces are key in combating drug trafficking into the United States.” U.S. and 
Mexico at Odds Over Tribunal International Criminal Court, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at A13. 
Requested US military and police aid to Mexico this year totals US$59.7m. The bulk of this 
is for antidrugs purposes: US$40m under the International Narcotics Control (INC) 
programme and US$18.4m under the ‘Section 1004’ Counterdrug programme run by the 
Pentagon. US military aid to Mexico, previously not enthusiastically welcomed, has been 
increasing steadily over the past decade, driven by the antidrugs effort. While between 1996 
and 2000 it totalled US$141m [sic] in 2004 alone it reached US$54m — 80% more than 
economic aid. 
MEXICO-US: Facing consequences of ICC ratification, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Nov. 1, 2005, at 11, 
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officials recognize the harmful effects that U.S. opposition measures have 
on important relationships with Latin America. 
V. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ABANDON ITS CURRENT OPPOSITION 
AND JOIN THE ICC TO FURTHER POLICY GOALS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Latin American nations have reacted strongly against the pressures 
placed upon them by the U.S. In addition, the U.S. opposition program 
against the ICC is crippling its ability to address urgent policy matters in 
the region. The Bush Administration has gone beyond the statutory 
authority of ASPA and placed poor Latin American countries in an unfair 
diplomatic position by forcing them to sign the BIAs.97 The U.S. threats to 
cut aid are unfair and go beyond reducing military aid, including possible 
decreases in aid for items such as hurricane relief and public health.98  
Latin American nations are reacting angrily to the Bush 
Administration’s demand that they sign BIAs.99 Indeed, eleven Latin 
American countries have decided to take the aid reductions rather than 
forgo their support of the ICC.100 U.S. relations with Latin America appear 
to be worsening, as the Washington Post’s Jackson Diehl recently 
observed, “[h]ere’s a sad but safe new year’s prediction: U.S. relations 
with Latin America, which plunged to their lowest point in decades in 
2005, will get still worse in 2006.”101 
 
 
available at http://www.latinnews.com/lwr/secure/oobptc.pdf.  
 97. Poor countries are forced to sign BIAs and violate their international obligations because they 
are threatened with losing vital U.S. aid. “[T]he Bush administration has been exercising 
unconscionable diplomatic tactics that go beyond the provisions of the ASPA: threatening poor 
countries in all regions of the world to violate their international obligations or otherwise lose vital US 
financial and political support.” Irune Aguirrezábal Quijera, The United States’ Isolated Struggle 
Against the ICC, ICC MONITOR, Sept. 25, 2003, at 3.  
 98. Caribbean nations have faced cuts in funding for everything from hurricane relief to rural 
dentistry. “U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker has reportedly threatened to deny 
benefits of the New Horizons program, which includes funds for hurricane relief and rural dentistry 
and veterinary efforts, to countries in the Caribbean Community.” Id.  
 99. Commentators are beginning to measure the effect of the Bush Administration’s program of 
opposition on Latin American attitudes toward the U.S. “The White House takes its jousting with 
imaginary enemies so seriously that real-world problems are cropping up. Latin American countries, in 
particular, are becoming angry over administration demands that they promise to protect U.S. officials, 
soldiers and even citizens from prosecution.” Editorial, International Justice: Losing Friends, THE 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 5, 2005, at B5. “Costa Rican Foreign Minister Roberto Tovar 
last month called the U.S. immunity proposals ‘offensive’ and added: ‘One can be poor, but 
dignified.’” Bachelet, supra note 78. 
 100. “Eleven countries in the hemisphere, including such democratic governments as Brazil and 
Costa Rica, no longer can participate in U.S.-funded military training programs.” Editorial, supra note 
99. 
 101. Jackson Diehl, Our Latin Conundrum, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2006, at A13. 
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A. The Ideological Confrontation with Latin America Over the ICC 
Latin American nations have resolved to continue supporting the ICC 
in the face of contrary U.S. pressure. This position is reflected by the 
Organization of American States, which passed a resolution in 2003 
offering strong support for the ICC despite pressure from U.S. 
opposition.102 The important South American nations which form the 
MERCOSUR trading bloc adopted an even stronger resolution in June 
2005, which prohibited each member nation from entering into a BIA with 
the U.S. or any other nation.103 
Thus, the Bush Administration has created an intense ideological 
confrontation with Latin American nations regarding the ICC.104 
Unfortunately, U.S. opposition to the ICC has been placed ahead of urgent 
U.S. policy priorities for the region.105 The frightening result of the U.S. 
opposition campaign is that it “shows that the President would rather allow 
drug trafficking and terrorism than support the prosecution of war crimes 
and atrocities.”106 
 
 
 102. Org. of American States [OAS], Promotion of the International Criminal Court A.G. Res. 
1929, OAS Doc. XXXIII-O/03 (June 10, 2003), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/OAS6_10_ 
03.pdf. 
 103. MERCOSUR offered the following regarding its opposition to the BIAs:  
We restate the necessity of guaranteeing the independence and efficacy of the International 
Criminal Court, as well as its universal reach through the cooperation of all States. Together 
we adopt a common position for MERCOSUR with regard to Section 2 of Article 98 of the 
Rome Statute. We commit to not enter into multilateral or bilateral agreements with third 
States which would affect the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court or other 
obligations established in the Rome Statute. 
MERCOSUR, Presidential Declaration of MERCOSUR’s Commitment to the Rome Statute of the Int’l 
Criminal Court, June 20, 2005, available at http://iccnow.org/documents/USandICC/2005/ 
MERCOSUR_Decl_BIA_Jun05.pdf. 
 104. Richard Dicker, director of the International Justice program of Human Rights Watch, said 
that “[t]he United States is bullying smaller, weaker countries because of an ideological obsession with 
an illusory threat . . . .” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 76. 
 105. Richard Dicker, director of the International Justice program of Human Rights Watch, stated 
that the “Bush Administration is putting its ill-conceived campaign ahead of other interests the U.S. 
government claims are its highest priorities.” Id.  
 106. Brian Thompson, Program Manager for Int’l Law and Justice, Citizens for Global Solutions 
Statement, in Press Release, Citizens for Global Solutions, U.S. Sanctions Key Allies over ICC 
Participation (Dec. 8, 2004), http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/membermediastatements/2004/CGS_ 
Nethercutt_08Dec04.pdf. 
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B. The Bush Administration Should Abandon the Opposition Campaign 
Against the ICC to Achieve Urgent Policy Priorities in Latin America 
The Bush Administration should immediately abandon its opposition 
campaign against the ICC and instead support the Court in order to 
achieve urgent policy priorities in Latin America. The economic sanctions 
that are central to the U.S. opposition campaign are completely 
unnecessary because the ICC established its legitimacy during the first few 
years it existed.107 The Court has only taken on the most appalling cases of 
crimes against humanity and thus has established that it will not pursue the 
frivolous prosecutions that the U.S. has so greatly feared.108 Indeed, the 
prosecutor for the ICC has stated publicly that he will not pursue 
allegations against the United States and the United Kingdom in Iraq.109 
If the U.S. would abandon the opposition campaign against the ICC, it 
could adopt a unified policy toward Latin America and turn its primary 
focus to urgent human rights concerns, such as drug trafficking and 
terrorism.110 The U.S. opposition campaign against the ICC reflects a 
general hostility by the Bush Administration towards multilateral 
diplomacy.111 However, this attitude within the administration must be 
changed to achieve its stated policy goals in Latin America.112 The 
 
 
 107. One commentator described the economic sanctions as “particularly unnecessary” because 
“the court has been in existence for over two full years now, and not only has the prosecutor taken up 
some of the most appalling crimes against humanity in the Congo and Uganda, but he’s also publicly 
rejected pursuing allegations against the U.S. and the U.K. in Iraq.” Id.  
 108. Id. See also text accompanying note 107. 
 109. See Press Release, supra note 106 and text accompanying note 107. 
 110. By abandoning its opposition against the ICC and its insistence that countries sign BIAs, the 
U.S. could restore aid to the region, which could be used to combat terrorism and drug trafficking. As 
a result, the U.S. would gain credibility in Latin America because it would join the region in 
supporting the ICC. The U.S. could also give serious attention to important policies such as combating 
drug trafficking and terrorism.  
 A policy of support for the ICC would yield the greatest results for both the U.S. and the Latin 
American region. “[H]uman rights policy will lack credibility and effectiveness unless it is consistent 
with other policies and actions. Mixed signals give mixed results: a policy tool, whether sanctions or 
quiet diplomacy, can yield only modest results when contradicted by other policies.” Suominen, supra 
note 18, at 6. “The Bush administration has this all wrong. Refusing to join the ICC weakens the U.S. 
effort to organize a global strategy against terrorism.” Editorial, Counterproductive to Pressure 
Mexico on World Court, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 2005, at A22. 
 111. This approach, however, contradicts the Bush Administration’s recognition that a multilateral 
policy is needed to confront drug trafficking and terrorism. “Conservative Republicans, like John 
Bolton, present a litany of justifications for United States opposition that are in large part nothing more 
than a general hostility to multilateral diplomacy and international organizations.” William A. 
Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s All About the Security 
Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 701, 719 (2004). 
 112. One Latin American expert recently recognized the United States’ self-interest in achieving 
its policy priorities in Latin America: 
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greatest available means for the administration to make this necessary 
policy shift would be joining the ICC.113 
U.S. support of the ICC would advance the recent movement in Latin 
America toward establishing the rule of law and instituting functioning 
democracies.114 These changes are essential if the Bush Administration is 
to attain its policy goals in the region.115 Further, U.S. ratification of the 
Rome Statute would be a diplomatic means of showing support to the 
many emerging Latin America democracies that are struggling to establish 
the rule of law in the face of terrorism threats and persistent drug 
trafficking.116 
C. The China Factor: With China’s Increasing Influence in Latin 
America, the U.S. Must Take Immediate Action to Improve Relations 
with the Region 
Perhaps the most immediate reason for the U.S. to ratify the ICC is 
China’s growing presence in the region.117 If the U.S. continues to lose 
 
 
Ultimately, the United States must look at its policy towards the region in strategic terms in 
its own right. U.S. interests are clear: the security of the United States requires a prosperous 
and stable Hemisphere. Our policies should not be simply extensions of U.S. domestic 
politics, whether it is in the appointment of officials or in the support of candidacies for 
international organizations. Nor should assistance be simply predicated on whether countries 
are willing to comply with the United States, whether regarding Article 98, or particular votes 
in international for matters not directly relevant to the Hemisphere. It should be based on a 
policy a [sic] genuine engagement that seeks the commonalities of interests and builds on the 
successes of this era of democratization while ensuring that it will endure. For that tohappen 
[sic] the Western Hemisphere must move up on the priority list of U.S. foreign policy.  
Keeping Democracy on Track: Hotspots in Latin America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Western Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 109th Cong. 43 (2005) (statement of 
Arturo Valenzuela, Ph.D., Director, Center for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University). 
 113. Schabas, supra note 111, at 719. 
 114. The United States has the opportunity to play a leading role in strengthening democratic 
institutions in Latin America: 
Some have suggested that the establishment of an international criminal court could also have 
considerable symbolic importance, as a demonstration of a collective international interest in 
and commitment to the prosecution and punishment of offenses of intense concern to the 
world community. United States’ [sic] participation and leadership in such efforts would be in 
keeping with dramatic trends of recent years, including the strong movement toward the rule 
of law and the restructuring of societies along democratic lines. 
Benjamin R. Civiletti, American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal Court New 
York State Bar Association Joint Report with Recommendations to the House of Delegates: 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 27 INT’L LAW. 257, 264 (1993). 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. See generally R. EVAN ELLIS, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE 
INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College) (June 2005), 
available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB606.pdf. 
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influence in Latin America over such issues as refusing to join the ICC, 
the Chinese are already poised to step in and fill the void.118 The Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in November 2004 
indicated deteriorating U.S. influence in Latin America, while at the same 
time the Chinese agreed to $10 billion in investment commitments to the 
region.119 
China’s ties to Latin America have developed in a simplified context. 
The U.S. has to concern itself with difficult issues in its diplomatic 
relations with the region.120 These include drug trafficking, terrorism, and 
democracy building because these activities have a direct impact on the 
U.S.121  
The growing Chinese presence in Latin America will reduce the ability 
of the United States to influence important Latin American policy 
decisions; therefore, immediate steps must be taken to restore U.S.-Latin 
American relations.122 The U.S. should act swiftly in making policy and 
diplomatic decisions that account for the increased role China will play in 
the region.123 Joining the ICC is necessary for the U.S. if it hopes to 
develop closer relationships with its Latin American neighbors and 
achieve urgent policy goals at a time when the Western hemisphere is 
experiencing geopolitical changes.  
 
 
 118. Chinese investment and trade with Latin American countries has spurred a rapid growth in 
China-Latin America relations. This growth is evidenced by the fact that in 2003, 77% of Chinese 
foreign investment outside of Asia went to Latin America. Id. at 35 n.23.  
 119. Chietigji Bajpaee, China Fuels Energy Cold War, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, May 2, 2005, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/GC-2Ad07.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2006). 
 120. Tim Johnson, China Sways to Latin Tune, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), July 10, 2005, at 
A10. 
 121. Many issues that the U.S. must confront regarding Latin America do not present obstacles to 
Chinese-Latin American relations. “Issues that bedevil U.S. relations with Latin America, such as drug 
trafficking, the fight against terrorism and threats to democratic rule, don’t hinder China’s ties to 
countries in the region . . . .” Id.  
 122. If the U.S. continues to lose influence in Latin America relative to China, it will become 
preoccupied with China’s activities in the Western Hemisphere. This will divert U.S. attention away 
from the issues of drug trafficking, terrorism, and the establishment of democratic institutions. “In 
general, the Chinese presence in Latin America reflects significant erosion in the relative power and 
geopolitical position of the United States, and the advent of a new century in which the United States 
is preoccupied about Chinese adventurism in the Americas.” ELLIS, supra note 117, at 23. 
 123. The U.S. must determine if it is willing to permit China to increase its political relations in 
Latin America and also how to achieve important policy goals while competing with China for 
influence in the region.  
[T]he United States needs to consider to what degree it is willing to accept a China that has 
increasing leverage in Latin America through its investment and trade presence―and a 
growing interest in the political course of the region. Now, rather than later, is the time for the 
United States to begin seriously considering how to most constructively engage the Chinese 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
ELLIS, supra note 117, at vi. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It is in the best interest of the U.S. to ratify the Rome Statute and join 
the ICC. U.S. government officials have long recognized that an 
international criminal tribunal such as the ICC is necessary to achieve 
justice under some circumstances,124 yet practical considerations may 
prove to be the strongest argument in favor of U.S. ratification of the 
Rome Statute. These practical considerations include concerns regarding 
terrorism and drug trafficking in the Western hemisphere. In order to form 
a unified policy that seriously addresses these concerns, the U.S. should 
abandon its current campaign against the ICC and join with the countries 
of Latin America in supporting the Court.  
Tom Madison* 
 
 
 124. David J. Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, provided the following 
testimony before the House Committee on International Relations regarding the circumstances when 
international criminal prosecutions are warranted: 
[W]e anticipate there will be instances in which it will be in the national interest to respond to 
requests for cooperation even if the United States is not a party to the ICC Treaty. We may 
decide that an international investigation and prosecution of a Pol Pot or Saddam Hussein and 
Idi Amin, a Foday Sankoh or some other rogue leader . . . would be in the national interest of 
the United States to support. 
The International Criminal Court: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on International Relations, 106th 
Cong. 41 (2000) (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues and 
Head of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations preparatory Committee for the International 
Criminal Court). 
 * B.A. (2001), Augustana College; J.D. Candidate (2007), Washington University School of 
Law. I would like to thank my parents (Ken and Renae) and the rest of my family (Anne and Rob) for 
their unconditional love and support. I also thank my dear friends in Nicaragua, where a large part of 
my heart remains, for their insight and perspective. I am also grateful to Washington University School 
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